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Sir Louis Blom-Cooper has had a distinguished career as QC, 
Chairman of Inquiries, advocate of Human Rights and campaigning 
author. This book is a collection of essays on topical and controversial 
issues. As one would expect of the author, he constantly expresses 
individual views and challenges orthodox opinion. The essays cover such 
diverse subjects as judicial review, Human Rights, the need for a new 
Homicide Act, trial by jury, criminal sentencing and penal policy, media 
freedom and regulation of the Press and include a number of diverting 
tales from his life at the Bar and pen-portraits of leading judges. It is only 
possible within the scope of this review to comment on some of the 
essays. 
Chapters 1 and 2 are essays on the subject of judicial review and the 
debate between proponents of judicial restraint and activism. Sir Louis 
takes as his starting point the FA Mann lecture of Lord Sumption in 2011. 
In it he discussed the issue of the separation of powers and posed the 
question “How far can judicial review go before it trespasses on the 
proper function of government and the legislature in a democracy?” Lord 
Sumption argued that the courts have gone outside the legitimate region of 
reviewing the application of governmental policy to individuals and have 
embarked on a review of policy itself. This lecture, delivered soon after 
his appointment direct from the Bar to the Supreme Court, caused a 
number of judicial eyebrows to rise. In a hostile critique of the lecture
1
 , 
Sir Stephen Sedley, former Lord Justice of Appeal, argued that a true 
analysis of the cases quoted by Lord Sumption showed that the judges 
were not in fact trespassing on the policy making functions of government 
but merely seeking to give effect to the principle expressed by Lord 
Hoffmann in the Alconbury case that what is in the public interest is for 
the legislature and ministers to judge, but that when ministers or officials 
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make decisions affecting the rights of individuals they must do so in 
accordance with the law. He ended with an implied rebuke that Lord 
Sumption‟s central allegation of repeated judicial intrusion might itself be 
seen as a political intrusion into the business of adjudication by judges. 
Sir Stephen, while a judge, was well known as an expert in judicial 
review and a supporter of the Human Rights Act
2
. I remember attending a 
judicial seminar soon after the introduction of the Act. The course 
included a number of exercises relating to bail applications. I ventured the 
view that such applications could be perfectly well managed under the 
present provisions of the Bail Act and the common law, without reference 
to the Human Rights Act. Sir Stephen rather sharply responded by saying 
that the whole process of granting bail would be transformed by the 
Human Rights Act. I am happy to say that in the years following the Act 
bail applications were dealt with exactly as before!  
In these essays Sir Louis suggests that the argument for judicial 
restraint, supported by Lord Sumption, may rest upon a misinterpretation 
of the concept of the separation of powers. It should more properly be 
described as the distribution of powers. The legislature, the executive and 
the judiciary are separate institutions but their powers are shared and not 
discrete. Thus the courts do not merely step in to strike down executive 
acts or decisions which are outside their powers given them by statute, but 
also take part in the law making process. When a statute is ambiguous or 
obscure the court will seek to interpret the statute. Any statute must by 
definition be ambulatory and require replenishment over time. Here the 
courts are recognisably secondary legislators. They may also step in 
where the legislature has failed to pass laws that are needed. Such actions 
by the courts are not a trespass upon the functions of government but an 
expression of the court‟s duty towards “peace, order and good 
government” as expressed by Lord Mansfield back in 17623. 
Sir Louis also refers to the introduction of the Human Rights Act as 
giving the judges express encouragement to activism. After 2000 the 
courts were empowered to declare any acts or decisions of ministers or 
civil servants as incompatible with Articles of the Human Rights 
Convention, and thus invite parliament to reform the legislation. This 
compromise with the legislators, affirmed the apportionment of powers, 
not their separation. 
Sir Louis has a distinguished record as a campaigner for the abolition 
of the death penalty and subsequently for reforming the laws of Homicide. 
It has long been accepted that the Homicide Act 1957 which introduced 
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the defence of “diminished responsibility” was an illogical and messy 
attempt at compromise. Since then attempts to reform the law have been 
obstructed by successive governments frightened by possible public 
backlash. In Chapter 7 Sir Louis prints the text of a submission made by 
himself and Professor Morris to the Law Commission in which they 
advocate a single homicide offence
4
. The Law Commission had supported 
a two-tier approach, the first tier being limited to the more serious offence 
of deliberate homicide.  Sir Louis points out that this is an arbitrary 
distinction. Why should intention rather than any other factor or factors be 
determinant of the seriousness of the offence? Applying the principles of 
Occam‟s razor, he argues that it would be simpler to have one single and 
comprehensive offence of homicide. This would be capable of including 
the present offences of causing death by dangerous driving and causing 
death in breach of the Health and Safety Act. The creation of a single 
offence would of course involve the abolition of the mandatory penalty 
for murder, long sought by jurists and campaigners. The sentencing 
tribunal could look at all the surrounding circumstances to judge the 
seriousness of the offence and any mitigating features before passing 
sentence. 
One of the difficulties with this proposal, recognised by Sir Louis lies 
in defining the requisite mens rea for the all- embracing single offence. Sir 
Louis suggests that it must be proved that the accused “demonstrated a 
serious failure to achieve the standard of care objectively to be expected 
of a reasonable person”. Thus, as he admits, proof of guilt in criminal 
homicide would approach the norm of strict liability. As a Judge I would 
not look forward to explaining that definition to a jury! 
In Chapter 9 Sir Louis turns his attention to trial by jury. It is clear that 
he is not an admirer of the jury system. He admits that he came to it late 
after long practice in the civil courts. He points out that Magna Carta, 
traditionally regarded as the foundation of English liberties, did not 
establish a right to trial by jury (rather, the essence of Magna Carta being 
“One Baron, one vote”). 
He begins by dismissing as hyperbole and exaggeration many of the 
classic defences of the jury system by such authoritative figures as Lord 
Devlin: 
 
“It is the lamp that shows that freedom lives” 
And Baroness Kennedy: 
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“The jury tradition is not only about the right of the citizen to elect 
trial but also about the juror‟s duty of citizenship. It gives people 
an important role as jurors, as stakeholders in the criminal justice 
system” 
 
It has to be said that Sir Louis is himself by no means averse to 
tendentious language when he describes the jury as: 
 
“The high point, the apotheosis of amateurism. As such it is 
potentially a recipe for incompetence and unbridled bias”    or 
 
“The verdict of the jury is an oracular utterance, devoid of any 
overt ratiocination” 
 
Sir Louis is right to say that in discussing the system, the important 
question is whether trial by jury provides as good or better quality of 
justice than other modes, and not whether it can be justified on social and 
constitutional grounds. 
He makes a number of valid points. Firstly that there is no 
constitutional or any general form of right to trial by judge and jury, only 
a general obligation to submit to it in indictable cases. The defendant 
when charged in such cases has no choice but to submit to trial by jury. 
Secondly, the jury does not give a reasoned verdict. Such a verdict, in 
the civil courts, would fall foul of Article 6 ECHR. In Taxquel v Belgium
5
  
the Grand Chamber, although it declined to favour any established mode 
of trial, declared that the system must produce a “reasoned verdict”. 
Thirdly, the method by which juries reach their verdicts cannot be 
tested or reviewed because research into their secretive workings is 
forbidden. 
Sir Louis suggests that many of the judges today conducting such 
trials express doubts about the operation of the jury system (at least in 
private). 
As a former circuit judge with nearly 30 years‟ experience of sitting in 
the Crown Court I have to take issue with Sir Louis on this point. There is 
no evidence or study which suggests that verdicts of juries are intrinsically 
less reliable than those of any other tribunal. He himself quotes the study 
of the Runciman Commission in 1993 which revealed that judges and 
prosecuting counsel thought that jury convictions ran contrary to law or 
evidence in only 2% of cases. 
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Ultimately Sir Louis falls back upon the old and patronising argument 
that the professional lawyer is imbued with a sense of “judiciality” by 
reason of legal training and education, whereas the juror lacks such a skill 
and cannot be expected to properly test the credibility and reliability of 
witnesses and other evidence. I would argue that jurors, with their 
diversity of background and experience are perfectly able to make 
common sense judgments on the reliability of evidence and certainly as 
capable as judges. Elsewhere in these essays
6
 Sir Louis refers to some 
“immensely clever judges and barristers” who when assessing evidence 
“exhibit the attributes of a man who has his feet firmly planted in mid-
air”. 
Most of the so-called miscarriages of justice in jury trials in recent 
years have been cases where the jury have been prevented from seeing or 
hearing evidence, for example by non-disclosure by the police or 
prosecution or through intervention by the judge. More recently there has 
been a tendency to allow the jury to see and assess for themselves more of 
the surrounding evidence (for example hearsay evidence and previous 
convictions)
7
. The cases show no indication that juries have been unable 
to make balanced judgments as to the relevance and reliability of such 
evidence. 
I agree with Sir Louis that there is a strong argument for creating 
some exceptions to the general principle of jury trial for indictable 
offences. Serious Fraud is such an example. In this field the jury‟s 
experience is likely to be very limited. There is need for professional 
expertise and understanding of complicated financial transactions. 
My experience of trial by jury in such cases has not been positive. An 
enormous amount of unnecessary paperwork is generated by the 
photocopier and by the fact that lawyers tend to get paid according to the 
number of pages in the court bundle. Once the trial has started it may 
needlessly be prolonged by the sitting of so-called Maxwell hours (half-
day sittings first instituted by Lord Phillips in the Maxwell case) and by 
clouds of forensic dust raised by defence counsel. As the trial drags out 
jurors lose interest and absence through “sickness” becomes more 
frequent.  Sir Louis makes a cautious recommendation that the defendant 
in such cases should be entitled to elect to waive the right to jury trial. In 
practice very few defendants (after advice from their lawyers) would 
make this choice unless they intended to plead guilty. A better course 
would be for the judge to decide the mode of trial having heard 
representations from prosecution and defence. 
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In Chapter 13 Crime and Justice: a shift in perspective, the author 
takes a radical look at the issue of the criminal justice system and crime 
control. He asks the question whether a criminal trial is a necessary forum 
to deal with the wide variety of criminal activity. He points out that 
criminal justice today is time-consuming, that the outcome is problematic 
and penal sanctions are costly and cumbersome. He deplores the 
politicians‟ rhetoric of law and order and its judicial reflection in the 
recent statement of the Lord Chief Justice
8
 that sentences passed by the 
criminal courts were obliged to focus on the reduction of crime. In the 
author‟s view the criminal courts should focus exclusively on ensuring a 
fair trial and abandon any notion that they are involved in society‟s 
grappling with problems of criminality. 
The implication of this argument is that sentencing can be 
appropriately dealt with by some other tribunal or public body specifically 
concerned with crime control and public policy. I have some sympathy 
with Sir Louis‟ view. What should be the basis of sentencing by a judge? 
When sentencing should he apply social or philosophical principles, or 
should he rely upon his discretion and experience in the courts, or should 
he be required to sentence in accordance with strict written guidelines? 
Over the years I have attended numerous judicial seminars on sentencing. 
I have never heard the classic issues of penology such as deterrence, 
retribution and rehabilitation specifically being discussed. Until recently, 
sentencing was always regarded as a matter for the discretion and 
experience of the judge subject to any relevant legislation and review by 
the Court of Appeal. The decisions of the Court of Appeal were 
notoriously idiosyncratic, depending upon the composition of the court. It 
would often be said by a judge, not entirely in jest, that though his 
sentence had been upheld by the Court of Appeal he still felt it to be right! 
Although in principle a sentence can only be reduced by the Court of 
Appeal on one of three grounds – that it was wrong in law, wrong in 
principle or manifestly excessive, in practice these principles are not 
adhered to and very frequently not even quoted in the judgment of the 
court. I have conducted a study of a large number of recent appeals 
against sentence. I found that the most common ground given for 
interfering with the judge‟s sentence was that it was “somewhat too long”. 
This is of course a long way from the “manifestly excessive” test and no 
ground upon which the Court of Appeal can validly interfere with 
sentence. 
Recently a new player has entered the field:  the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council. This is made up of both lawyers and lay members. 
                                                     
8
 R v Monteiro [2014] EWCA 747. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
 
331 
They have issued so-called sentencing guidelines for the majority of 
offences. These in practice form a sort of grid whereby the judge can pass 
his finger down the grid and select his sentence. In justification of this 
process it is claimed that it brings consistency to sentencing. Such a guide 
to sentencing may be of some help, for example to the commercial judge 
sitting in the Crown Court or Court of Appeal for the first time, but it can 
surely be no replacement for the discretion and experience of the judge 
obtained through many years of sitting in the Crown Court. 
In a number of chapters Sir Louis includes lively anecdotes of his life 
at the Bar, famous cases such as Rondel v Worsley
9
 and the trial of James 
Hanratty and pen-portraits of famous judges. Chapter 33 is devoted to 
Lord Denning. To those of us who cut our teeth in the law in the „70s and 
early „80s Lord Denning was a giant who made long-lasting contributions 
to the development of the law in promissory and proprietary estoppel and 
in many other fields. Sir Louis‟ description of him is as a “judicial misfit” 
is therefore disappointing. He views him as judge who allowed his own 
private views on the merits of a claim to override legal rules and principle. 
This seems to be based least in part upon a number of cases in which he 
appeared unsuccessfully in front of him including the rather hum-drum 
case of Lake v Essex County Council
10
 which he quotes in extenso, and 
upon the doubtless jocular remarks made by Lord Denning to the author at 
lunch in Middle Temple Hall after the case. Most barristers of my 
generation will have reminiscences of Lord Denning. My favourite does 
not relate to an incident in court but to a cricket match in which I played 
for the Bar against a village team on the ground next to Lord Denning‟s 
home in Hampshire. He invited us all in for lunch and insisted on being 
introduced to my wife and each of my young children. On another 
occasion, when I had injured my finger taking a catch, he wrote a personal 
letter of sympathy. 
The book ends with a delightful chapter on Academics and 
Practitioners. Sir Louis traces the development of the links between 
academics and those practising in the courts from the time in his early 
days when it was only possible to cite a textbook as legal authority if the 
author was deceased, to the present day where academic lawyers such as 
Lord Goff, Lord Justice Beatson, Lady Hales and Lord Sumption have 
been appointed to the High Court Bench. The development of modern law 
is now an interplay between legal commentary and law in action. In his 
conclusion Sir Louis paints a picture of the continuing pilgrimage of the 
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two professions together developing a legal system in a modern liberal 
democracy. 
This chapter ends a book which is a stimulating and thought-
provoking read for practitioners and academics alike. 
